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Abstract
With billions of personal images being generated from
social media and cameras of all sorts on a daily basis,
security and privacy are unprecedentedly challenged. Al-
though extensive attempts have been made, existing face
image de-identification techniques are either insufficient in
photo-reality or incapable of balancing privacy and usabil-
ity qualitatively and quantitatively, i.e., they fail to answer
counterfactual questions such as “is it private now?”, “how
private is it?”, and “can it be more private?” In this paper,
we propose a novel framework called AnonymousNet, with
an effort to address these issues systematically, balance us-
ability, and enhance privacy in a natural and measurable
manner. The framework encompasses four stages: facial
attribute estimation, privacy-metric-oriented face obfusca-
tion, directed natural image synthesis, and adversarial per-
turbation. Not only do we achieve the state-of-the-arts in
terms of image quality and attribute prediction accuracy,
we are also the first to show that facial privacy is measur-
able, can be factorized, and accordingly be manipulated in
a photo-realistic fashion to fulfill different requirements and
application scenarios. Experiments further demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed framework.
1. Introduction
The deployment of internet of things devices, such as
surveillance cameras and sensors, are rising dramatically in
recent years. Particularly, the popularity of smartphones al-
lows billions of photos being uploaded to social networks
and shared among people on a daily basis. Although the
blooming development has advanced machine learning ap-
plications to bring convenience and enhance user experi-
ence, it may capture confidential information incidentally
and increases the risks of privacy leakage. To protect pri-
vacy, the most straightforward approach is access control
[51], such as the “Restrict Others” setting in Facebook [31].
Cryptography techniques such as encryption and secure
multi-party computation [28] can also be applied to mitigate
(a) Original (b) Blurring (c) Pixelation (d) Ours
Figure 1: A brief comparison of obfuscation methods. Our
approach not only de-identifies an image by synthesizing a
photo-realistic alternative, but also provides a controllable
and measurable way for privacy preservation. Moreover,
an adversarial perturbation is introduced to further enhance
security and privacy against malicious detectors.
privacy threats. In computer vision community, privacy-
enhancing technologies are mainly obfuscation-based; for
example, obfuscating sensitive information like faces and
numbers in an image by using traditional approaches in-
cluding blurring, pixelation, and masking (see Figure 2).
However, there are at least two drawbacks with these tra-
ditional approaches. First, researchers have shown these
techniques are vulnerable. The faceless person recognition
system proposed in [43] can be trained with limited training
samples and then identify the target in an obfuscated image
by using body features. Another study also shows that deep
learning models can successfully identify faces in images
encrypted with these techniques with high accuracies [38].
Second, images processed with these techniques result in
unsatisfying perception in general. A study shows that both
blurring and blocking will impact image perception scores,
and even lower scores are observed for images obfuscated
by blocking [31].
On the other hand, new techniques and mechanisms are
being applied to enhance image obfuscation. A game the-
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Figure 2: Comparison of canonical image processing methods for face obfuscation. From left to right are blurring, pixelation,
masking, deep Convolutional Neural Network-based style transfer [19] (abstract painting style, portrait painting style, and
cartoon style [15]), and Generative Adversarial Network-based image inpainting [61].
ory framework called Adversarial Image Perturbation has
been proposed to determine effective image obfuscation ap-
proach when the choice of countermeasures is unknown
[44]. Recently, the generative adversarial networks (GAN)
can generate realistic natural images following original in-
put data distribution via adversarial training [11], therefore
it has become more and more popular for novel image ob-
fuscation techniques. Wu et al. [60] developed a GAN with
two newly designed modules verificator and regulator for
face de-identification. Considering subjects in social media
photos appear in diverse activities and head orientations,
Sun et al. [52] proposed a two-stage model to inpaint the
head region conditioned on facial landmarks.
Note that there exists a tradeoff between privacy protec-
tion and dataset usability [63, 14]. High obfuscation lev-
els fail to preserve utility for various tasks while low ob-
fuscation levels lead to recognition of private information.
Unfortunately, current methods are unable to find a way to
quantify this matter; neither can they be adapted with cor-
respondence to various privacy metrics nor real-world sce-
narios under different requirement settings. To tackle these,
we propose the AnonymousNet, a four-stage frameworks
consisted of facial semantic extraction powered by a deep
Convolutional Neural Network [23]; a attribute selection
method with regards to privacy metrics such as k-anonymity
[54], l-diverse [37], and t-closeness [24]; a Generative Neu-
ral Network [11] for photo-realistic image generator; and a
universal adversarial perturbation [40] to mitigate potential
security and privacy threats.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides necessary background in privacy-preserving data
mining and reviews recent advances in facial image editing;
Section 3 formalizes the face de-identification problem and
introduce privacy metrics; Section 4 outlines the four-stage
AnonymousNet framework, including facial feature ex-
traction, semantic-based attribute obfuscation, de-identified
face generation, and adversarial perturbation; Section 5 de-
tails experiment settings and evaluate the results; we con-
clude this paper in Section 6 by discussions of future re-
search directions.
2. Related Work
Facial Landmark Detection Photo privacy protection in-
cludes two important aspects: sensitive content detection
and obfuscation method [30]. Facial information is one of
the highest sensitive contents. Various head poses, orien-
tations, lighting conditions and so on make photo privacy
protection more challenging. Facial landmark detection has
been an active research field because it is the first important
step for other facial-related applications. In the past few
decades, numerous algorithms like support vector machine
[46] and random forecast [2] have been proposed. Despite
these models have made significant progress, they rely on
handcrafted local features and may not operate under a wide
range of conditions like illumination, occultation, poses.
Recently deep learning models have made huge ad-
vances to deal with issues like occultation and variability
in facial landmark detection. [53] proposed a cascaded con-
volutional network for facial keypoint detection which can
utilize the texture context information over the entire face
and encode geometric constraints implicitly. Further, a deep
multi-task learning framework is presented that combine fa-
cial landmark detection with correlated tasks like head pose
estimation [64]. Dong et al. (2018) adopted a generative
adversarial network to transform facial images into style-
aggregated ones, which are then deployed together to train
a facial landmark detector [8].
Image Inpainting Previous study shows that comparing
with image blurring and blocking, image inpainting pro-
vides a more effective and better user experience [30]. Face
replacement has become a popular image inpainting tech-
nology for privacy protection. [4] created a large face li-
brary from public internet. Given an input face, the most
similar one in the library will be chosen for face replace-
ment. [39] applied a 2D morphable model to adjust the
shape of a source face to match the target face. [33] pro-
posed a framework to generate a personalized 3D head
model from one frontal face. The 3D head model can then
be rendered at any pose to swap with the face in the target
image. Figure 2 compares several classic image processing
methods for face identity obfuscation.
GAN-based Face Generation Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN) is a system of two neural networks who
contests with each other under a zero-sum game setting.
GAN was first introduced by Goodfellow et al. [11] in 2014.
Since then, great progresses have been made, as shown in
Figure 3: in 2015, Radford et al. [45] designed deep convo-
lutional generative adversarial networks (DCGANs) which
demonstrated the adversarial pair (both the generator and
discriminator) can learn a hierarchy of representations from
object parts to scenes; Liu et al. [34] proposed coupled
generative adversarial network (CoGAN) in 2016, which
is capable of learning a joint distribution with only sam-
ples from marginal distributions and without tuple of corre-
sponding images from different domains; Karras et al. [20]
described a new training method for GAN in 2017, whose
main idea is to train generator and discriminator progres-
sively by starting from a low resolution and adding new lay-
ers of the model with fine details incrementally; and more
recently, Karras et al. [21] proposed a style-based genera-
tor architecture (StyleGAN) that is able to learn high-level
facial attributes in a automated and unsupervised manner,
generates images with stochastic variations, and achieves
the state-of-the-art.
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining Theories and practices
of privacy-preserving techniques have been studied exten-
sively in the database and data mining communities; to
name a few: [1, 6, 56]. To measure the disclosure risk of
an anonymized table of a database, Samarati & Sweeney
(1998) [50] introduced the k-anonymity property such that
Figure 3: Progresses of GAN-based face generation since
2014 [10] (from left to right: GAN (2014) [11], DCGAN
(2015) [45], CoGAN (2016) [34], Karras et al. (2017) [20],
and StyleGAN (2018) [21]).
each record in the database is indistinguishable with at least
k − 1 records. Although being sufficient to protect against
identity disclosure, k-anonymity is limited to prevent at-
tribute disclosure. In regards to that, Machanavajjhala et
al. (2006) [37] introduced a new privacy property called l-
diversity, which requires protected attributes to have at least
l well-represented values in each equivalence class. Newton
et al. (2005) [42] introduced the first privacy-enabling al-
gorithm, k-Same, to the context of image databases. Gross
et al. (2005) [13] demonstrated a tradeoff between disclo-
sure risk (i.e., image obfuscation level) and classification
accuracy. To tackle this, they introduced k-Same-Select to
balance privacy and usability. Zhang (2018) [63] further de-
signed a OBFUSCATE function that adds random noises to
existing samples or creates new samples, in an effort to hide
sensitive information in the dataset while preserving model
accuracy.
3. Preliminary
3.1. Formulation of Face De-Identification
We first formally define the problem of face de-
identification, extending notations and definitions from
Newton et al. [42]. This process is important as it helps
us to precisely define the methods and to build a solid foun-
dation for following discussions of theoretical properties.
Definition 3.1. (Face Image). A face image (or simple
‘face’ or ‘image’) is a 3D matrix I of m columns, n rows,
and c channels. c is usually 3 in common color spaces (e.g.,
RGB and YUV). Each cell in I stores a color coding for a
pixel, ranging from 0 to 255 inclusively. A face image con-
tains a normalized image of only one person’s face.
Definition 3.2. (Face Set). A face set is a set of M face
images: {Γi : i = 1, . . . ,M}.
Definition 3.3. (Person-Specific Face Set). Let H be a
face set of M face images, {Γi, . . . ,ΓM}. H is said to be
person-specific if and only if each Γi ∈ H only relates to
one person and Γi 6= Γj for any i 6= j.
Definition 3.4. (Face De-Identification Function). Let H
and Hd be person-specific face set.
f : H→ Hd (1)
is called face de-identification function if it attempts to ob-
fuscate the identity of the original face image.
Definition 3.5. (De-Identified Face). Given Γ ∈ H and
de-identification function f , Γd ∈ Hd is a f de-identified
face of Γ if
Γd = f(Γ) (2)
Figure 2 illustrates several canonical image processing
methods for face de-identification, including blurring, pixe-
lation, masking, deep Convolutional Neural Network-based
style transfer [19] (abstract painting style, portrait painting
style, and cartoon style [15]), and Generative Adversarial
Network-based image inpainting [61].
3.2. Privacy Metrics
The motivation of privacy metrics is to provide qualita-
tive and quantitative measurement of the degree of privacy
enjoyed by specific users (personal images in our case) and
the proper amount of privacy protection offered with corre-
spondence to trade-offs in usability. This section, we only
discuss metrics that are used in our framework. [57] pro-
vides a more comprehensive list for interested readers.
k-Anonymity k-anonymity is a widely applied metric to
evaluate a dataset’s level of anonymity [50]. It requires that
each record in the dataset is indistinguishable with at least
k − 1 other records with respect to quasi-identifiers, which
refer to attributes that can potentially be taken together to
identify an individual like zip code or birth date [24]. In
the case of a face dataset, these quasi-identifiers may in-
clude semantic attributes like eyeglasses, pointy nose, and
oval face, and so on. If a dataset satisfies the condition of
k-Anonymity, with only quasi-identifiers of one individual
known, the true record can only be chosen with a probabil-
ity of 1/k.
However, there are some scenarios that k-anonymity
cannot provide enough protection. For example, for k sub-
jects that have the same values for the quasi-identifiers, if
they all have the same sensitive attribute like heart disease,
an adversary can be certain that the target identify in the k
subjects must have heart disease. The k-Anonymity thus
fails to protect sensitive information from the homogeneity
attack [24].
l-Diversity l-diversity is proposed to address the limita-
tions of k-anonymity [37]. The basic concept is that for
the equivalence class representing a set of records with the
same values for the quasi-identifiers, it should have at least
l “well-represented” values for the sensitive attribute.
The most straightforward definition of “well-
represented” values is to ensure the equivalence class
has l distinct values for the sensitive attribute. In this defini-
tion, the frequencies of l distinct values are not considered.
An adversary may conclude that the sensitive attribute of a
targeted identity has the value with the highest frequency.
Therefore there is a stronger definition of l-diversity named
Entropy l-diversity, which is defined as follows:
Entropy(E) ≥ log l (3)
Entropy(E) = −
∑
s∈S
p(E, s) log p(E, s) (4)
where E is the equivalence class, S is the value set of the
sensitive attribute, and p(E, s) is the fraction of records in
E that have sensitive value s.
t-Closeness Adversaries sometimes have knowledge of
the global distribution of sensitive attributes, for example,
the distributions of facial attributes are easy to obtain (see
Figure 6). To prevent privacy disclosure by an adversary
with such knowledge, [24] introduced t-closeness, which
updates k-anonymity with correspondence to the distribu-
tion of sensitive values, requiring that the distribution SE
of sensitive values in any equivalence class E must be close
to their distribution S in the entire database, i.e.,
∀E : d(S, SE) ≤ t (5)
where d(S, SE) is the distance between distribution S and
SE measured by the Earth Mover Distance [47] and t is the
privacy threshold at which d(S, SE) should not exceed.
Randomness Randomization is another approach to pro-
tect data privacy. It is realized by adding random noise
to existing samples [63]. Given an individual sample, we
can randomly select part of its features with a ratio of γ,
and add Gaussian noise N(0, σ). Instead of random fea-
ture selection, we can also identify sensitive features first,
and add Gaussian noise N(0, σ). Another randomization
approach is to introduce new samples into the dataset [63].
To generate a new sample, we can randomly pick an origi-
nal sample from the dataset, revise its feature value and add
small amount of noise at the same time. For example, the
value xi of pixel i in an original image can be replaced with
255 − xi with Gaussian noise N(0, σ) added in the new
sample. From a broader perspective, adversarial perturba-
tion can also be consider as a randomization method.
Attribute Labels
Deep 
Features 
Preprocessed Image
CNN
Random Forest 
Random Forest 
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Figure 4: Overview of the facial attribute prediction pipeline. We train a deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) fed
by preprocessed and labelled images, and then extract deep features from the fully connected (FC) layer of the CNN and
accordingly train random forest classifiers to predict facial attributes (the full attribute list can be found in Figure 6).
4. The AnonymousNet
In an effort to obfuscate facial identities and gener-
ate photo-realistic alternatives, balance privacy and usabil-
ity qualitatively and quantitatively, answer counterfactual
questions such as “is it private now?”, “how private is it?”,
and “can it be more/less private?”, and finally achieve con-
trollable and measurable privacy, we propose the Anony-
mousNet framework, which encompasses four stages: fa-
cial feature extraction, semantic-based attribute obfusca-
tion, de-identified face generation, and adversarial pertur-
bation, as detailed below.
Stage-I: Facial Attribute Prediction
We adopt GoogLeNet [55] for facial attribute extraction,
which consists of 22 layers witn 9 Inception blocks and ex-
celled in ImageNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition Chal-
lenge 2014 [49]. Unlike most other classifiers in ImageNet
[7], GoogLeNet is not trained for one label, but rather is fed
with 40 facial attributes at the same time and outputs mul-
tiple classification results accordingly. GoogLeNet further
leverages a trick of using 1 × 1 kernels to increase depth
while reducing dimension and reserving computational re-
sources. Figure 4 outlines the facial attribute prediction
pipeline, where labelled images are first fed into the model,
features are extracted from the fully connected (FC) layer,
and then 40 random forest classifiers [32] are trained and
facial attributes are subsequently obtained.
Stage-II: Privacy-Aware Face Obfuscation
Provided with semantic information of each facial im-
age as well as attribute distribution over the entire database
(see Figure 6), we are one step closer towards our goal:
face de-identification with privacy guarantees. We first con-
sider a toy example: database consist of 2 identities, both
of which share a common attribute <Male>. In this case,
modifying the gender attribute will not change the level
of privacy, since altering this attribute will not change the
Algorithm 1: The PPAS algorithm.
Result: Attribute set A′′.
1 Attribute set A← {E1, . . . , En};
2 Attribute set A′ ← ∅ ;
3 Size N ← ||A|| ;
4 for i = 1, . . . , N do
5 if d(S, SEi) ≤ t then
6 Add attribute Ei to A′ ;
7 else
8 Add attribute ¬Ei to A′ ;
9 end
10 end
11 return A′′ ← Perturbation(A′, ) ;
possibility of guessing the identity given gender. Consider
another example that for the same database and each en-
tity has three boolean attributes: <Male, Big Nose,
Black Hair> and one identity has black hair and the
other does not. For this case, both of them should be up-
dated to either black hair or non-black hair since the identity
will be revealed if the hair color is known. These two ex-
ample provide us insights of how to select facial attributes
such that k-anonymity and l-diversity are satisfied.
However, as discussed in Section 3.2, this may not be
enough to protect privacy, since sensitive information that
reveals identities can still be revealed by exploiting global
distributions of the attributes [24]. Here, we propose the
Privacy-Preserving Attribute Selection (PPAS) Algorithm,
a method to select and update facial attributes such that the
distribution SE of any attribute E is close to its real world
distribution S subject to constraint defined in Equation 5.
Unlike normal t-closeness, we further introduce a stochas-
tic perturbation in the attribute selection process working
toward -differential privacy [9]. Our approach is formal-
ized in Algorithm 1 (for binary attributes).
Stage-III: Natural and Directed De-Identification
To obfuscate facial images while preserve visual real-
ity, we adopt a generative adversarial network (GAN) [11],
which is designed as two players, D and G, playing a min-
max game with adversarial loss:
Ladv = E[log(D(x))] + E[log(1−D(G(x)))] (6)
where generator G is trained to fool discriminator D, who
tries to distinguish real images from adversarial ones. GAN
has been successful in many applications [21, 29] yet is no-
toriously difficult to train [27]. As the face de-identification
task can be categorize as a image-to-image translation prob-
lem, we customize the GAN model based on StarGAN [5],
which has been widely demonstrated to have high usabil-
ity along with realistic results, and the keys of which are
attribute classification loss Lcls and image reconstruction
loss Lrec. Ladv , Lcls and Lrec forms the final objective
function:
L = λ1Ladv + λ2Lcls + λ3Lrec (7)
Stage-IV: Adversarial Perturbation
Adding a Gaussian noise to an image is generally con-
sidered as a simple and effective way to trick deep neural
network-based detectors which have been showcased to be
vulnerable against this attack. There are also approaches
that carefully craft perturbations for each data point. For ex-
ample, [12] propose a fast gradient sign method to perturb
an input through one step of gradient ascent. Furthermore,
[40] shows there exists a universal adversarial perturbation
that can cause images misclassified with high probability
by state-of-the-art deep neural networks. The basic idea is
formulated as follows: Suppose µ is the a distribution of im-
ages in <d, kˆ is a classifier that the output given an image x
is kˆ(x). The universal perturbation vector v ∈ <d that can
fool the classifier kˆ should satisfy:
‖v‖p ≤ ξ (8)
Px∼µ(kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x) ≥ 1− δ) (9)
where ξ limits the size of the universal perturbation vector,
δ quantifies the failure rate of all the adversarial samples.
In this work, we introduce a universal perturbation vec-
tor as identified through an iterative approach. For each it-
eration i, we apply DeepFool [41] to identify the minimal
perturbation to let kˆ misclassify each input, and update the
universal perturbation corresponding to hyperparameter i
to the total perturbation v. It is shown that the algorithm
works on a small portion of images sampled from the train-
ing dataset, and the universal perturbation generalizes well
with respect to the data and the network architectures. Fig-
ure 5 outlines the proposed perturbation pipeline.
Original Perturbation Adversary
+  ε ×  =
Figure 5: An example of adversarial perturbation. In stage-
IV, we introduce a small universal perturbation adjusted by
parameter  to synthesized images, tricking malicious de-
tectors while preserving perceptual integrity.
5. Experiment
5.1. Dataset
We use Large-scale CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA)
Dataset [36] for facial attribute estimation, which contains
202, 599 images and 10, 177 identities. Each image has 40
attributes labels of boolean values, and their distributions
have been shown in Figure 6. Following the same protocol
as described in [36], we split the dataset into three folders:
160, 000 images (8, 000 identities) for training; 20, 000 im-
ages (1, 000 identities) for validation; and the rest 20, 000
images (1, 000 identities) for testing.
5.2. Image Preprocessing
Before feeding the data into our deep models, we per-
form data preprocessing for each images in the datasets,
including steps in order: face detection, landmark detec-
tion, alignment, and image cropping. To obtain face land-
marks, we deploy a Deep Alignment Network (DAN) [22],
which is a deep neural network of multiple stages and has
demonstrated convincing performance even in extreme pose
or lighting conditions in the wild. Based on the 68 land-
marks provided by DAN for each image, we align and cen-
ter the face in the image by calibrating positions of both left
and right eyes. Subsequently, we crop the images to a size
of 256×256. Figure 7 illustrates the preprocessing pipeline.
Original Landmark Detection Alignment andCropping
Figure 7: Image preprocessing pipeline. We deploy a Deep
Alignment Network (DAN) [22] to obtain facial landmarks,
based on which we accordingly align faces and crop images.
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Figure 6: Facial attributes and their distributions in the CeleA dataset [36].
5.3. Training
Attribute Estimation. As discussed in Section 4 earlier, a
GoogLeNet [55] is deployed for attribute estimation, using
the same training settings as [26]. We adopt sigmoid cross-
entropy as the loss function:
L = − 1
n
∑
[y ln a+ (1− y) ln(1− a)] (10)
where y is label and a is output. When training, we use a
base learning rate of 10−5, which is reduced by a polyno-
mial decay with a gamma of 0.5. Momentum is set to be
0.9 and the weight decay is 2 × 10−4. 6 × 105 iterations
with a batch size of 64 are conducted for the training. After
extracting deep features from the FC layer, we train 40 ran-
dom forest classifiers for attribute estimation and achieve an
accuracy that is comparable to current state-of-the-art [48].
Attribute Translation. After obtaining facial attributes
that satisfies privacy constraints computed from previous
steps, we employ StarGAN [5] for face attributes transla-
tion and use CeleA [36] as the training set. We follow the
settings in [5], where Wasserstein loss [3] is adopted to ex-
pedite the training process and the definition is as below:
Ladv = Ex[Dsrc(X)]− Ex,c[Dsrc(G(x, c))] (11)
= −λgpExˆ[(||∇xˆD(xˆ)||2 − 1)2] (12)
where xˆ is uniformly sampled between a pair of original and
synthesized images and we use λ = 10 here. In terms of
network architecture, we adopt a generator network of two
convolutional layers for downsampling, six residual blocks
[16], and two transposed convolutional layers for upsam-
pling; and we use PatchGANs [18] as the discriminator net-
work for binary classification (i.e., whether certain image
patches are fake or real).
5.4. Evaluation
Figure 1 compares our approach with canonical face ob-
fuscation methods, showcasing a significant improvement
in photo-reality and a success in face de-identification. Fig-
ure 8 illustrates experimental results in pairs, where left
is the original image and right is the result generated by
our framework. It demonstrates that face identities are pre-
served in a perceptually natural manner, and in the mean-
time, each pair of images still shares certain common at-
tributes in correspondence with various privacy policies and
application scenarios (for example, pair (1, 4) differs in hair
color, lip color, gender, and age, but shares the same eye
sizes; pair (1, 1) only differs in gender and leaves other se-
mantic attributes identical). Also, artifacts introduced by
the proposed the adversarial perturbation are shown to be
visually negligible, even though they have been upscaled
for illustrative purposes. Table 1 compare image quality un-
der widely used perceptual metrics. Being aware that these
model-based metrics fail to capture many nuances of human
perception [62] and a smaller or larger value does not nec-
essarily imply higher or lower image quality [25], we list
the results here only for reference purpose.
Blurring Pixelation Masking Inpainting Ours
PSNR [17] 24.532 22.802 15.459 18.097 20.079
SSIM [58] 0.8281 0.8226 0.8762 0.8020 0.7894
MS-SSIM [59] 0.8842 0.8784 0.8204 0.7659 0.8650
Table 1: Image quality comparison under different metrics.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
To naturally obfuscate face identities while preserves
privacy in a controllable and measurable manner, we pro-
posed the AnonymousNet framework, which consists of
four stages: facial feature extraction, semantic-based at-
Figure 8: Some experimental results. In each pair, left is the original image and right is the synthesized result with an
altered identity. The results show that face identities are preserved in a perceptually natural manner, and in the meantime,
each pair of images still shares certain common attributes in correspondence with various privacy policies and application
scenarios. Furthermore, artifacts introduced by the proposed the adversarial perturbation are shown to be visually negligible
(the perturbation has been intentionally upscaled here for illustrative purposes).
tribute obfuscation, de-identified face generation, and ad-
versarial perturbation. This framework successfully over-
comes the shortages of existing methods - being able to
generate photo-realistic images with fake identity and ca-
pable of balancing privacy and usability both qualitatively
and quantitatively. It also answers questions such as “is it
private now?”, “how private is it?”, and “can it be more/less
private?” counterfactually. Considering the threats from ad-
versaries, especially the malicious detectors that are preva-
lent in today’s Internet, we further introduced a universal
adversarial perturbation so as to trick other deep neural net-
works as much as possible. Experimental results support the
effectiveness of our approach by showing photo-realistic re-
sults with negligible artifacts.
In the future, we would like to evaluate perturbation per-
formance among different deep neural network-based de-
tectors qualitatively and quantitatively, which is ignored
here due limitations in space and computational resources.
We are also interested in robustness, scalability, and exten-
sibility of this framework under various real-world settings.
In the experiments, we find that different facial attributes
vary in “distinguish power”, i.e., attributes such as Age and
Gender are perceptually more powerful in helping distin-
guish an identity than Cheekbones Height, which align
with our intuitions. This advises a future research direction
that a user study can be made to explore these differences
qualitatively and quantitatively, and in the end, figure out
“the crux of facial indistinguishability”.
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